File Name: faith and rationality reason and belief in god creator.zip
One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed for most of these consequences to be achieved. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Alvin Carl Plantinga [a] born is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion , epistemology particularly on issues involving epistemic justification , and logic. From to , Plantinga taught at Calvin University before accepting an appointment as the John A. A prominent Christian philosopher, Plantinga served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from to He has delivered the Gifford Lectures two times and was described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God".
Some of Plantinga's most influential works include God and Other Minds , The Nature of Necessity , and a trilogy of books on epistemology, culminating in Warranted Christian Belief that was simplified in Knowledge and Christian Belief Plantinga — and Lettie G. Bossenbroek — Plantinga's father was a first-generation immigrant, born in the Netherlands. Plantinga's father earned a PhD in philosophy from Duke University and a master's degree in psychology, and taught several academic subjects at different colleges over the years.
Plantinga married Kathleen De Boer in Another of his brothers, Leon , is an emeritus professor of musicology at Yale University. After Plantinga completed 11th grade, his father urged him to skip his last year of high school and immediately enroll in college.
Plantinga reluctantly followed his father's advice and in , a few months before his 17th birthday, he enrolled in Jamestown College , in Jamestown , North Dakota. During his first semester at Calvin, Plantinga was awarded a scholarship to attend Harvard University.
Beginning in the fall of , Plantinga spent two semesters at Harvard. In , during Harvard's spring recess, Plantinga attended a few philosophy classes at Calvin University, and was so impressed with Calvin philosophy professor William Harry Jellema that he returned in to study philosophy under him.
Plantinga began his career as an instructor in the philosophy department at Yale in , and then in , he became a professor of philosophy at Wayne State University during its heyday as a major center for analytic philosophy. In , he accepted a teaching job at Calvin University, where he replaced the retiring Jellema. He has trained many prominent philosophers working in metaphysics and epistemology including Michael Bergmann at Purdue and Michael Rea at Notre Dame, and Trenton Merricks working at University of Virginia.
Plantinga served as president of the American Philosophical Association , Western Division, from to Awardees deliver a lecture at Baylor University and their name is put on a plaque with Plantinga's image in the Institute for Studies in Religion. He was named the first fellow of the center as well. He was awarded the Templeton Prize. Plantinga has argued that some people can know that God exists as a basic belief , requiring no argument.
He developed this argument in two different fashions: firstly, in God and Other Minds , by drawing an equivalence between the teleological argument and the common sense view that people have of other minds existing by analogy with their own minds. Plantinga has also argued that there is no logical inconsistency between the existence of evil and the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God. Plantinga proposed a "free-will defense" in a volume edited by Max Black in ,  which attempts to refute the logical problem of evil , the argument that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God.
Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures. However, the argument's handling of natural evil has been disputed. According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , the argument also "conflicts with important theistic doctrines", [ clarification needed ] including the notion of heaven and the idea that God has free will.
Mackie sees Plantinga's free-will defense as incoherent. Plantinga's well-received book God, Freedom and Evil , written in , gave his response to what he saw as the incomplete and uncritical view of theism's criticism of theodicy.
Plantinga's contribution stated that when the issue of a comprehensive doctrine of freedom is added to the discussion of the goodness of God and the omnipotence of God then it is not possible to exclude the presence of evil in the world after introducing freedom into the discussion. Plantinga's contributions to epistemology include an argument which he dubs "Reformed epistemology". According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be rational and justified even without arguments or evidence for the existence of God.
More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic , and due to a religious externalist epistemology, he claims belief in God could be justified independently of evidence. His externalist epistemology, called "proper functionalism", is a form of epistemological reliabilism. Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and proper functionalism in a three-volume series.
In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate , Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm , BonJour , Alston , Goldman , and others. In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function , he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability.
Plantinga asserts that the design plan does not require a designer: "it is perhaps possible that evolution undirected by God or anyone else has somehow furnished us with our design plans",  but the paradigm case of a design plan is like a technological product designed by a human being like a radio or a wheel. Ultimately, Plantinga argues that epistemological naturalism - i.
In , the third book of the trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief , was published. In this volume, Plantinga's warrant theory is the basis for his theological end: providing a philosophical basis for Christian belief, an argument for why Christian theistic belief can enjoy warrant. The former attempts to show that a belief in God can be justified, warranted and rational, while the Extended model tries to show that specifically Christian theological beliefs including the Trinity , the Incarnation , the resurrection of Christ , the atonement , salvation etc.
Under this model, Christians are justified in their beliefs because of the work of the Holy Spirit in bringing those beliefs about in the believer. James Beilby has argued that the purpose of Plantinga's Warrant trilogy, and specifically of his Warranted Christian Belief , is firstly to make a form of argument against religion impossible—namely, the argument that whether or not Christianity is true, it is irrational—so "the skeptic would have to shoulder the formidable task of demonstrating the falsity of Christian belief"  rather than simply dismiss it as irrational.
In addition, Plantinga is attempting to provide a philosophical explanation of how Christians should think about their own Christian belief. Plantinga has expressed a modal logic version of the ontological argument in which he uses modal logic to develop, in a more rigorous and formal way, Norman Malcolm 's and Charles Hartshorne 's modal ontological arguments.
Plantinga criticized Malcolm's and Hartshorne's arguments, and offered an alternative. It does not, he argued, demonstrate that such a being has unsurpassed greatness in this world. In an attempt to resolve this problem, Plantinga differentiated between "greatness" and "excellence". A being's excellence in a particular world depends only on its properties in that world; a being's greatness depends on its properties in all worlds.
Therefore, the greatest possible being must have maximal excellence in every possible world. Plantinga then restated Malcolm's argument, using the concept of "maximal greatness". He argued that it is possible for a being with maximal greatness to exist, so a being with maximal greatness exists in a possible world. If this is the case, then a being with maximal greatness exists in every world, and therefore in this world. The conclusion relies on a form of modal axiom S5 , which states that if something is possibly true, then its possibility is necessary it is possibly true in all worlds.
Plantinga's version of S5 suggests that "To say that p is possibly necessarily true is to say that, with regard to one world, it is true at all worlds; but in that case it is true at all worlds, and so it is simply necessary. Plantinga argued that, although the first premise is not rationally established, it is not contrary to reason. Michael Martin argued that, if certain components of perfection are contradictory, such as omnipotence and omniscience, then the first premise is contrary to reason.
Martin also proposed parodies of the argument, suggesting that the existence of anything can be demonstrated with Plantinga's argument, provided it is defined as perfect or special in every possible world. Another Christian apologist, William Lane Craig , characterizes Plantinga's argument in a slightly different way:.
According to Craig, premises 2 — 5 are relatively uncontroversial among philosophers, but "the epistemic entertainability of premise 1 or its denial does not guarantee its metaphysical possibility. Gale argued that premise three, the "possibility premise", begs the question.
He stated that one only has the epistemic right to accept the premise if one understands the nested modal operators , and that if one understands them within the system S5—without which the argument fails—then one understands that "possibly necessarily" is in essence the same as "necessarily".
On S5 systems in general, James Garson writes that "the words 'necessarily' and 'possibly', have many different uses. So the acceptability of axioms for modal logic depends on which of these uses we have in mind. In Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism , he argues that if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism. His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value maximizing one's success at the four Fs: "feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing" , not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true.
Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves.
On the other hand, if God created man " in his image " by way of an evolutionary process or any other means , then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable. The argument does not assume any necessary correlation or uncorrelation between true beliefs and survival. Making the contrary assumption—that there is, in fact, a relatively strong correlation between truth and survival—if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a survival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true beliefs confer a survival advantage.
Plantinga counters that, while there may be overlap between true beliefs and beliefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs are not the same, and he gives the following example with a man named Paul:. Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it Clearly there are any number of belief-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behaviour.
The argument has received favorable notice from Thomas Nagel  and William Lane Craig ,  but has also been criticized as seriously flawed, for example, by Elliott Sober.
Even though Alvin Plantinga believes that God could have used Darwinian processes to create the world, he stands firm against philosophical naturalism. He said in an interview on the relationship between science and religion that:.
Religion and science share more common ground than you might think, though science can't prove, it presupposes that there has been a past for example, science does not cover the whole of the knowledge enterprise. Johnson 's book Darwin on Trial , he also provided a back-cover endorsement of Johnson's book: "Shows how Darwinian evolution has become an idol. He was a Fellow of the now defunct pro-intelligent design International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design ,  and has presented at a number of intelligent design conferences.
Like any Christian and indeed any theist , I believe that the world has been created by God, and hence "intelligently designed". The hallmark of intelligent design, however, is the claim that this can be shown scientifically; I'm dubious about that. As far as I can see, God certainly could have used Darwinian processes to create the living world and direct it as he wanted to go; hence evolution as such does not imply that there is no direction in the history of life. What does have that implication is not evolutionary theory itself, but unguided evolution, the idea that neither God nor any other person has taken a hand in guiding, directing or orchestrating the course of evolution.
But the scientific theory of evolution, sensibly enough, says nothing one way or the other about divine guidance. It doesn't say that evolution is divinely guided; it also doesn't say that it isn't. Like almost any theist, I reject unguided evolution; but the contemporary scientific theory of evolution just as such—apart from philosophical or theological add-ons—doesn't say that evolution is unguided.
Like science in general, it makes no pronouncements on the existence or activity of God. The attitude that he proposes and elaborates upon in Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism is that there is no tension between religion and science, that the two go hand in hand, and that the actual conflict lies between naturalism and science. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. American Christian philosopher. Ann Arbor , Michigan , U. Kathleen De Boer. Rescher Prize Templeton Prize
Traditionally, faith and reason have each been considered to be sources of justification for religious belief. Because both can purportedly serve this same epistemic function, it has been a matter of much interest to philosophers and theologians how the two are related and thus how the rational agent should treat claims derived from either source. Some have held that there can be no conflict between the two—that reason properly employed and faith properly understood will never produce contradictory or competing claims—whereas others have maintained that faith and reason can or even must be in genuine contention over certain propositions or methodologies. Those who have taken the latter view disagree as to whether faith or reason ought to prevail when the two are in conflict. Other thinkers have theorized that faith and reason each govern their own separate domains, such that cases of apparent conflict are resolved on the side of faith when the claim in question is, say, a religious or theological claim, but resolved on the side of reason when the disputed claim is, for example, empirical or logical. Some relatively recent philosophers, most notably the logical positivists, have denied that there is a domain of thought or human existence rightly governed by faith, asserting instead that all meaningful statements and ideas are accessible to thorough rational examination.
Alvin Carl Plantinga [a] born is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion , epistemology particularly on issues involving epistemic justification , and logic. From to , Plantinga taught at Calvin University before accepting an appointment as the John A. A prominent Christian philosopher, Plantinga served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from to He has delivered the Gifford Lectures two times and was described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God". Some of Plantinga's most influential works include God and Other Minds , The Nature of Necessity , and a trilogy of books on epistemology, culminating in Warranted Christian Belief that was simplified in Knowledge and Christian Belief
Faith and reason are both sources of authority upon which beliefs can rest. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Alvin Plantinga Editor ,. Nicholas Wolterstorff Editor. This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book.
Pragmatic arguments have often been employed in support of theistic belief. Theistic pragmatic arguments are not arguments for the proposition that God exists; they are arguments that believing that God exists is rational. Though we touch on this argument briefly below, this entry focuses primarily on the theistic pragmatic arguments found in William James, J.
Moral arguments are both important and interesting.
However, it is not always sufficiently clear what such balance consists of. Some maintain that Aquinas elaborated his philosophical view without being under the influence of faith. If we do not limit ourselves to considering faith as the assent to the revealed truth, but also look at what leads the believer to assent—i. On the one hand, the truths of faith cannot participate in the rational inquiry, because according to Aquinas faith lacks the evidence searched for by natural reason. They will also be criterion , because in case of a contradiction between rational arguments and revealed truths, reason must be considered mistaken and the rational investigation must start anew from the beginning. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below! Faith and reason—Addresses, essays, lectures.
Different conceptions of faith cohere with different views of its relation to reason or rationality. The classic medieval understanding of faith, set forth by Thomas Aquinas , saw it as the belief in revealed truths on the authority of God as their ultimate source and guarantor. Thus, though the ultimate object of faith is God, its immediate object is the body of propositions articulating the basic Christian dogmas. Such faith is to be distinguished from knowledge. Whereas the propositions that are the objects of scientia, or knowledge, compel belief by their self-evidence or their demonstrability from self-evident premises , the propositions accepted by faith do not thus compel assent but require a voluntary act of trusting acceptance. It follows that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time in relation to the same proposition; faith can only arise in the absence of knowledge.
madvirgin.org: Faith And Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (): Alvin Plantinga, Alvin Plantinga (Editor), Nicholas Wolterstorff (Editor).
In the philosophy of religion , Reformed epistemology is a school of philosophical thought concerning the nature of knowledge epistemology as it applies to religious beliefs. Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between what he calls de facto from de jure objections to Christian belief. A de facto objection is one that attempts to show that Christian truth claims are false. In contrast, de jure objections attempt to undermine Christian belief even if it is, in fact, true.
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ture or total way of looking at faith, knowledge, belief, rationality, and allied topics. (1) God is the omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good creator of the world.Aaliyah L. 09.05.2021 at 21:06
Faith and rationality reason and belief in god pdf creator. Reason and Rationality, Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassalo, eds. (Frankfurt: say, “good riddance” may.